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THREE STORIES AND THEIR MORALS 
THREE STORIES AND THEIR MORALS 
By 
•Robert B. Bennett, Jr. 
Fundamentally, the common law tradition is a collection of stories.! 
Stories also become the law professor's stock in trade. We tell 
• Professor of Business Law, Butler University. 
Accord, Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call o/Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 
(1991) (fitting "feminist narratives" within the context oflegal scholarship); 
Mark A. Clawson, Disruptions 0/Literature: Telling Stories: Romance and 
Dissonance in Progressive Legal Narratives, 22 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 353, 357 
(1998) ("Legal education teaches students that storytelling skills are the stock­
in-trade of the legal profession. Legal arguments are created, much like a simple 
fable, from the stock elements of facts and law."); Nancy Cook, Speaking in and 
About Stories, 63 U. CrN. L. REv. 95,95 (1994) ("Law professors tell war stories 
to their students, clients tell stories to lawyers; lawyers, in turn, provide judges 
and juries with stories on behalf of clients. The courts ultimately relate stories 
through judicial opinions."); Nancy Levit & Allen Rostron, Law Stories: Tales 
from Legal Practice, Experience and Education: Calling/or Stories, 75 UMKC 
L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2007) ("Storytelling is a fundamental part ofJegal practice, 
teaching, and thought."); Christine Metteer Lorillard, Stories that make the Law 
Free: Literature as a Bridge Between the Law and the Culture in Which it Must 
Exist, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 251, 255 (2005) ("Legal stories fall within the 
general description of narrative, but with a different end: the law is about 
prioritizing stories, choosing one story over another. The law seldom hears only 
one side of the story. In the law, two or more storytellers explain what happened 
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students stories or have them read stories in the form of cases or 
hypothetical situations and help them discern the morals to the 
stories-i.e., what the stories mean in the context of business or in 
their business lives? In a sense, that is what the Socratic Method is all 
about: analyzing stories in the form of cases and discerning their 
greater meaning. 3 In this paper I will relate three true stories4 within 
to them and how it felt, and ask another to stand for a moment in their shoes. 
Legal storytellers, then, use stories rhetorically, in an attempt to persuade others 
to accept their version of what has happened in the world, or to change another's 
views or understanding about world events."); Sandra Craig McKenzie, 
Storytelling: A Different Voice for Legal Education, 41 .KAt". L. REv. 251,251 
(1992) ("Lawyers are storytellers, using stories as a means of solving problems 
for clients. Although lawyers tell stories in a variety of settings, the 
quintessential example of legal storytelling occurs in the courtroom, where two 
lawyers meet to tell opposing stories about 'what really happened on the night of 
June 12th ' ... The judge's opinion is the final version of the story, distilled from 
the versions told by the opposing lawyers."); Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal 
Storytelling: Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2075 (1989) 
("To make sense of law and to organize experience, people often tell stories. 
And these stories are telling."). But see David R. Culp, Law School: A 
Mortuary for Poets and Moral Reason, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 61, 61 (1994) 
("The study of law will train you for many different fields, but it will not train 
you to embark upon one endeavor: It will not equip you to become a poeL"). 
2 See generally, Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Evidence: StOlytelling in the 
Classroom, 41 AM. U. 1. REv. 453 (1992) (discussing how she uses short stories 
based upon the life of John Wigmore to review the Federal Rules of Evidence); 
Peter T. Wendel, Great Property Cases: Using Property to Teach Students to 
"Think Like a Lawyer:" Whetting Their Appetites and Aptitudes, 46 ST. LOUIS 
LJ. 733 (2002). 
3 The use of the "Socratic Method" or the "case method" is generally credited 
to Christopher Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School in the 1870s. For a 
discussion of the case method and its development and criticism, see W. Burlette 
Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REv. 1 (1997); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Casebooks: Contracts Scholarship in the Age ofthe Anthology, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1406 (1987); David D. Gamer, The Continuing Vitality ofthe Case Method 
in the Twenty-First Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307 (2000); Cynthia G. 
Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The 
Debate Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. I (1998); 
Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out ofSchool: Teaching the Case ofBrown v. 
Voss, 16 CARDOZO 1. REv. 1445,1446-48 (1995). Note that some, like 
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the context ofjust-in-time production management and develop their 
morals or implications for business and business lawyers. 
STORY 1: THE DEFECTIVE COMPONENTS 
Once upon a time,S when 1was still practicing law in Charlotte, North 
Carolina,6 I got a call from an agitated client. 7 This client was one of 
Professor McKenzie, would quibble with my characterization of the story 
aspects of the case method, focusing on Langdell's pursuit of "science" in legal 
education through use of the case method; see, e.g., McKenzie, supra note I, at 
259-62. 
4 Although we normally associate morals with Aesop's Fables, with apologies 
to "Dragnet," all of these stories are true--or true enough; the names have been 
changed to protect the innocent. 
S This is the way fairy tales usually begin, but all of the parties in my stories 
mayor may not live "happily ever after." See, also, Jennifer Howard, From 
'Once Upon a Time' to 'Happily Ever After ':Fairy-tale scholars explore the 
nuanced history ofthe genre, CHRONICLE REV., May 22,2009, at B6 (discussing 
recent scholarship regarding the origins and dissemination of fairy tales); 
Scheppele, supra note I, at 285 ("Storytelling can be seen as a deeply patterned 
activity. English speakers know when they hear 'once upon a time' that a story 
is about to begin. 'And they live happily ever after' is clearly an ending."). 
6 J practiced for eleven years for the Charlotte, North Carolina, law fIrm of 
Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., who now disavow any knowledge of 
my actions, though its members hasten to point out that if they ever knew me, 
the statute of limitations has run. Because the key events in the fIrst two stories 
took place in North Carolina and because the UCC is in flux with respect to 
some of the issues discussed, cites herein are to the North Carolina version of 
the UCC and other statutes. 
7 It is worth emphasizing that this is how nearly all lawsuits begin, with a caB 
from a client who tells a story--or at least his version of it. ClassifIcations of 
law-and the law itself-are abstractions developed by lawyers to categorize 
and help resolve disputes which come to lawyers and courts in the form of 
stories. Consider the famous quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. 
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral or political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, 
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, 
have :1ad a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
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the sales managers for a warehouser and distributor of high grade 
metal components. The company acquired the metal products from 
major metals processors and would sell these products as a 
"middleman" to manufacturers throughout the southeastern United 
States [hence, we will refer to my client as "MM, Inc."]. Among its 
customers was a fabricator of airline seats ["SeatCo"] to which it sold 
high grade aluminum tubular rods manufactured by a huge alumimun 
manufacturing company ["AICo"]. SeatCo would take the rods and 
bend them to form a frame for the airline seat, to which it would 
attach the other seating material. 
MM, Inc. had just gotten a call from an irate officer of SeatCo about 
the latest delivery of tubular aluminum rods. As SeatCo began 
bending the rods to form the airline seats, the rods broke instead of 
bending. MM, Inc. immediately called AICo to find out how that 
could be possible. AICo admitted that if the aluminum was 
incorrectly or insufficiently processed, it would result in rods that 
were insufficiently malleable for the intended purpose. It admitted 
that the rods were defective and promised to replace them. However, 
because of the necessary fabrication time, the earliest that the 
replacement rods could be delivered was six weeks later. SeatCo had 
some rods from an earlier shipment on hand, but only enough to keep 
its factory operating for a few days. For the remainder of the six 
weeks, SeatCo was facing a complete factory shutdown for want of 
aluminum tubes. 
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The 
law embodies the story of a nation's development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained 
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. 
OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe Ed. 1964). 
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MM, Inc. called me to find out if it had risk of liability for the sale of 
the faulty aluminum rods and the consequent shutdown of the 
production line. I told the sales manager that SeatCo could and 
probably would sue MM, Inc. if SeatCo had to shut down its 
production line for the better part of six weeks. Moreover, SeatCo 
had strong chances of success in its suit because the delivery of the 
defective tubes probably breached warranties ofmerchantability8 and 
fitness for a particular purpose9 under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (2009) provides:
 
Implied warranty: Merchantability; usage of trade
 
(I) Unless excluded or modified (G.S. 25-2-316), a warranty 
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract 
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods 
of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or 
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a 
sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are offair average quality 
within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of 
even kind, qual ity and quantity within each unit and among all 
units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the 
agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations offact made on 
the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (G .S. 25-2-316) other implied 
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
9 N.C.GEN.STAT. §25-2-315 (2009) provides: 
Implied warranty: Fitness for particular purpose 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know any particular purpose for which the goods arc required 
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
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However, I was not too concerned about ultimate liability for the 
consequential damages resulting from the shutting down the factory 
for two reasons. First, to be liable for consequential damages, a court 
must conclude that the shutdown of the factory was a foreseeable 
consequence of the delivery of the faulty materials. to Second, even if 
modified under the next section [G.S. 25-2-316] an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
10 The original precedent on foreseeability of losses for breach of contract was 
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341; 146 E. R. 145 (1854). In Hadley v. Baxendale, 
the plaintiffs were millers in Gloucester. The crankshaft of their steam engine 
which powered the mill broke and they arranged with the firm of W. Joyce & 
Co. of Greenwich to produce a new shaft using the old shaft as a model. The 
plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendants to transport the old shaft to 
be repaired. In the first count of their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants promised delivery within two days. In the second count, the 
plaintiffs alternatively claimed that the shaft was to be delivered "within a 
reasonable time." The shaft was not delivered for a period of seven days; as a 
result, the plaintiffs argued that they were thereby prevented from working their 
steam mill, were unable to supply their customers, had to buy flour for some of 
their customers, were compelled to pay wages, and suffered lost profits. They 
sought 300£ as compensatory damages. Trial was held before Judge Crompton 
at the Gloucester Assizes. At trial, the evidence showed that the plaintiffs' 
servant told the defendants' clerk that the mill was idled and that the shaft must 
be sent immediately and "that a special entry, ifrequired, should be made to 
hasten its delivery." The delivery "was delayed by some neglect." The 
defendants countered that the damages were too remote to hold the defendants 
liable. Judge Crompton left the issue of damages to the jury which returned a 
verdict of 50£. On appeal, the Court of Exchequer agreed with the defendants 
and reversed, granting the defendants a new trial. In that decision, Baron 
Alderson stated: 
We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: 
where two parties have made a contract which one of them has 
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in 
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly 
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. 
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of 
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they 
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 
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Applying the principle that he had enunciated, he argued that the only special 
circumstances communicated to the defendant were that the article to be carried 
was a broken mill shaft and that the plaintiffs were millers. He was unwilling to 
acknowledge that this conveyed adequate knowledge of the special 
circumstances to the defendant. He reasoned that the plaintiff might have 
another millshaft (which the court hinted was a common precaution at the time) 
or there might be other problems at the mill. In either event, the production of 
the mill would not be solely dependent on the timely delivery of the millshaft 
and, therefore, "the loss of profits here cannot reasonably considered such a 
consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably 
contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract." Alderson 
argued that had the defendant known of the special circumstances of the 
contract, he could have provided for the breach with special terms. 
The legacy of Hadley v. Baxendale finds its way into the UCC in N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-715 (2) (2009), which defines "consequential damages" 
resulting from the seller's breach which" include (a) any loss resulting from 
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of 
contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by 
cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty." (Emphasis added.) For a discussion of Hadley in 
its historical context, see Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the 
Industrialization ofthe Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); and A. W. B. 
Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 L. Q. REv. 247 
(1975). For a discussion of the history of the foreseeability requirement, see 
Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Just-In-Time Purchasing and the Problem of 
Consequential Damages, 26 UCC L.J. 332,340-49 (1994). 
Hadley has found its way into the jurisprudence of the former British 
colonies and remains the subject of vigorous intellectual debate. See, e.g., B.E. 
Adler, The Questionable Ascent ofHadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev 1547 
(1998-9); Wayne Barnes, The Boundaries ofContract in a Global Economy: 
Hadley v. Baxendale and Other Common Law Borrowings From the Civil Law, 
II TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 627 (2005); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, 
Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 665 (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic 
Bargaining and the Economic Theory ofContract Default Rules, 100 YALE L. J. 
615 (1990); Peter Linzer, Hadley v. Baxendale and the Seamless Web ofthe 
Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 225 (2005); Joe Spurlock II et aI., Panel 
Discussion: Hadley v. Baxendale: Still Crazy After All These Years, 11 TEX. 
WESLEY AN L. REv. 707 (2005); Andrew Tettenborn, Forseeability and 
Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale: Contract Doctrine or Compensation Rule?, II 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 505 (2005); Andrew Tettenbom, Hadley v. Baxendale 
Foreseeability.' a Principle Beyond Its Sell-by Date?, 23 J. CONTRACT L. 120 
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a court concluded that the shutdown was foreseeable, MM, Inc. 
chances in a third party suit against AICo would be strong. I J AICo 
had also breached the warranty of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose in its sale to MM, Inc. 12 and had probably also 
been negligent in its manufacturing. In fact, AICo had already 
admitted that it was at fault. Further, because of its knowledge of its 
own production schedule, it would have been in a better position than 
MM, Inc. to anticipate the consequences of a delivery of defective 
aluminum rods. Also AICo was a solvent defendant, well able to pay 
any damages that might be awarded. That meant that MM, Inc.'s 
ultimate legal risk was likely to be comparatively small. 
(2007); Jennifer O'Reilly & Robert B. Bennett, Jr., A Comparative Review of 
Contract Damages in Australia and the United States, in 31 PROC. TRI-STATE 
ACAD. LEGAL STUD. BUS. 1 (2007). 
Probably because of its compelling story, The cases applying Hadley 
are legion; see, e.g.: Globe Refining Company v. Landa Cotton Oil Company, 
190 U.S. 540,23 S. Ct. 754 (1903); Hendricks & Associates, Jnc. v. Daewoo 
Corp., 923 F.2d 209 (I st Cir. 1991); Hampton by Hampton v. Federal Exp. 
Corp., 917 F.2d J 119 (8th Cir. 1990); Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 
890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989); Nyquist v. Randall, 819 R.2d 1014 (11th Cir. 
1987); Van Moorlehem v. Brown Realty Co., 747 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1984); 
American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Western Industries, Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 722 F.2d 81 (4th 
Cir. 1983); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Pemberton v. Ovatech, Inc., 669 F. 2d 533 (8th Cir. 1982); Hector Martinez and 
Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1981); Luick v. 
Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1973); W.L. Green Industries, 
Inc. v. Western Intertrading, Ltd., 1992 WL 122785 (S.D.N.Y., 1992); Anna 
Ready Mix, Inc. v. N. E. Pierson Const. Co., Inc., 747 F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.III., 
1990). 
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 13 and J4 (2009) permit a party to bring a 
third party claim against "a person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him." 
12 See notes 8 and 9 supra. 
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The sales manager breathed an audible sigh of relief. I said, "Don't 
relax too soon." 
"What do you mean?" 
"Well, I thought that SeatCo was your single biggest customer," I 
said. 
"It is," he said. 
"How do you think that the officers at SeatCo are going to react if 
they have to shut down the factory for six weeks? They are going to 
be looking for scapegoats. Even if AICo makes the company 
financially whole, are they going to want to rely on you in the future? 
Are you still going to have a customer?" 
"Oh, [expletive deleted]." 
My client got offthe phone with me and immediately took a series of 
steps to insure that SeatCo would not have to shut down the factory. 
First, he found some rods from an earlier shipment in stock in the 
warehouse and shipped them to SeatCo. Then he went into the "spot 
market" and bought some rods from his competitors and shipped 
them to SeatCo. He even bought some excess inventory from his 
other customers and delivered them to SeatCo in his personal car. 
Ultimately he was able to scrape together enough inventory to keep 
SeatCo running until AICo could produce another shipment of 
conforming rods. These were probably not profitable transactions 
because of the additional costs of the spot purchases and the small 
deliveries, but MM, Inc. was able to avoid the far greater costs 
associated with litigation and, more importantly, it was able to keep 
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its largest customer. In other words, the parties lived happily ever 
after. 
STORY 2: INTRODUCTION OF JUST-IN-TIME 
MANAGEMENT 
Once upon a time, at roughly the same time as SeatCo was running 
into its difficulties, I had dinner with my brother who was then 
working for a big textile company ("MiIJCo") that bought raw 
materials and produced and dyed fabrics and carpeting for the 
automotive industry. He related to me excitedly how MillCo was a 
pioneer in this new industrial process called Just-in-Time production 
management ("JIT"). As he then described it, the principle behind JIT 
was to reduce inventory and inventory costs throughout the industrial 
process. 13 "We have gotten this down to a science," he bragged. "We 
13 This is somewhat of an oversimplification, but it does adequately capture one 
of the principal end results. JIT refers to a number of management techniques 
which attempt to eliminate waste in production, including waste resulting from 
overproduction, waste of employee time, waste in transportation, waste in 
processing, inventory waste, waste of movement and waste resulting from 
defective products and other quality control problems. The name, JIT, conveys 
the central philosophy: producing goods in exactly the quantity needed and 
sending them to where they are needed, when they are needed. The goal of the 
manufacturer is to reduce inventory at every stage of the manufacturing process, 
from the time the raw materials or component parts are delivered to the factory 
until the finished goods are shipped to the buyer. Goods are "pulled" through the 
system by market demand rather than "pushed" by production capacity. The 
ideal lot size for a given product would be one. For a summary of JIT, as well as 
a discussion of some of the legal issues inherent in the use of third party 
suppliers, see Bennett, supra note 10, at 332-39. For a more detailed look at 
lIT and its implementation, see, e.g., ROBERT W. HALL, ZERO INVENTORIES 
(1983); ROBERT W. HALL, ATTAfNfNG MANUFACTURING EXCELLENCE (1987); 
ROBERT W. HALL ET AL., MEASURfNG UP: CHARTfNG PATHWAYS TO 
MANUFACTURfNG EXCELLENCE (1991); MASAAKf IMAI, KAIZEN: THE KEY TO 
JAPAN'S COMPETJTlVE SUCCESS (1986); TA1ICHI OHNO, TOYOTA PRODUCTION 
SYSTEM: BEYOND LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION (1988) (English Translation of 
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get small daily deliveries ofmaterials and we just take materials from 
the loading dock directly to the production line." 
"Let me ask you," I said. "What happens if you go out to the loading 
dock and nothing is there?" Thinking of my recent experience with 
MM, Inc., I added, "Or what happens if the stuffon the loading dock 
doesn't meet specifications?" 
[Silence, followed by horrified stare.] 
STORY 3: THE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT 
Once upon a time, I was having dinner recently with a management 
consultant from the world's most prestigious-and expensive­
management consulting firm ("McFirm"). This consultant for 
McFirm was a specialist who worked with manufacturing companies 
throughout Germany. We were sharing information about our jobs 
when he asked about my research. I mentioned that among the areas 
that I researched were the legal issues surrounding lIT. 
"What legal issues are there?" 
"Well, for example, when the manufacturer uses outside suppliers, 
contract issues come into play." 
1978 Japanese Work); KrYOSHI SUZAKI, THE NEW MANUFACTURING 
CHALLENGE: TECHNIQ S FOR CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (1987); RJCHARD J. 
SCHONBERGER, JAPANESE MANUFACTURfNG TECHNIQUES: NfNE HIDDEN 
LESSONS fN SIMPLICITY (1982); JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHfNE THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD: THE STORY OF LEAN PRODUCTION (1990); JAMES P. 
WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES, LEAN THfNKfNG: BANISH WASTE AND CREATE 
WEALTH fN YOUR CORPORATION (2003). 
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With typical German candor (or bluntness) he responded, "That 
doesn't sound very exciting." 
"What happens if the supplier doesn't deliver, or if the supplier 
delivers late, or if the supplier delivers nonconforming goods?" 
[Long silence] That doesn't happen. 14 If it did happen a time or two, 
the supplier would lose a customer." I5 
"Are you sure that would be the result? And the only result?" 
"Sure. If a delivery is late, the factory would have to shut down.,,16 
14 In fact, it does happen; James R. Freeland, A Survey ofJust-In-Time 
Purchasing Practices in the United States, 32/2 PRODUCTION & INVENTORY 
MGMT. J. 43, 47 (1991) ("Some 33% of the responding companies reported they 
had experienced downtime over the past year because of poor supplier 
performance for JIT-purchased parts. Nearly half of the downti me occurrences 
was the result of late deliveries, and most of the rest were caused by quality 
problems. Thus, JIT can apparently cause some downtime."); Glenn Walberg, 
Note, Everything Old is New Again: Reaching the Limits ofINDOPCO 's 
Benefits With the Just-In-Time Management Philosophy, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1257, 1260-65 (1997) (differentiating between "pragmatic" and "romantic" 
approaches to JIT, arguing that the romantic approach seeks a revolution in the 
workplace which is more likely to result in adverse consequences including 
disruption of manufacturing operations.). 
15 This may be a practical extralegal resolution of such a problem between the 
parties. The actual legal rules are a trifle more complicated and would depend 
upon whether there was a written contract, what its terms were and the effect of 
course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade. For a contract 
which apparently included just such a provision, see Windsor Mold Inc. v. 
Express Molding International Inc., 130 A.C. W.S. (3d) 86 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 
2004), aff'd, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 285 (2005). 
16 Id. at ~ 24 ("All parties understand the concept of ' Just in Time' in this 
industry and that under no circumstances would a supplier ever want to cause a 
halt in production because of the high costs that would be incurred. I am 
satisfied that everyone knew that this was a very important issue."). 
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I could not resist: "Sounds pretty exciting to me." I persisted: 
"Assuming that the factory does shut down, whose problem do you 
think that is?" 
"Unless the manufacturer has done something wrong, like ordered the 
wrong goods, or ordered in the wrong sequence, or put the wrong 
date on the order, it is the supplier's problem. The supplier has the 
responsibility to deliver the parts to the manufacturer's loading dock 
on time; then it becomes the manufacturer's problem.,,17 
17 Of course, among other things, this assumption reverses the normal uee 
default rule that title and risk of loss normally pass when goods are delivered by 
the seller to a common carrier. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-308(a) (2009) ("Unless 
otherwise agreed (a) the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of 
business or ifhe has none, his residence"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401(2) 
(2009) ("Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time 
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the 
physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and 
even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; 
and in particular and despite any reservation ofa security interest by the bill of 
Jading 
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the 
buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the 
buyer at the time and place of shipment; but 
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender 
there."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-504 (2009) ("Where the seller is required or 
authorized to send the goods to the buyer and the contract does not require him 
to deliver them at a particular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must 
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such a contract 
for their transportation as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
goods and other circumstances of the case; and 
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any document necessary 
to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods or otherwise required by 
the agreement or by usage of trade; and 
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment. 
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper contract 
under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss 
ensues"). 
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"I am not sure that it is always that simple. How do you know that to
 
be the result?"
 
"That is what the contracts always provide," he said.
 
"Have you seen the contracts on this point?"
 
"Yes."
 
"What if there is no written contract?"
 
"There are always written contracts; 18 it would be crazy not to have a
 
written contract."l9
 
The same default rule is found under German law. BGB § 269 (2007), 
available in English translation at http://www.gesetze-im­
intemet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html; NIGELG. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM & LAWS 254-55 (J 993). 
18 In fact, a survey of United States lIT purchasing practices disclosed that forty 
percent of respondents did not use formal written contracts in the JIT purchase 
of parts. Freeland, supra note 14, at 46 (The author of this survey did observe 
that although the percentage having contracts did not differ much from those 
who did not purchase their materials on a JIT basis, those purchasing JIT having 
contracts were more likely to have a more inclusive contract. Id. at 49.). The 
results of this empirical study are generally consistent with the results of Stewart 
Macaulay's famous empirical study, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REv. 55, 58 (1963). and other attempts to look 
at actual business practices. Professor Jennings makes the same point in her 
inimitable style: 
While standing before an audience of purchasing managers 
involved in international sales transactions, the author was 
humiliated. After the announcement of the seminar's coverage 
(offer, acceptance, consideration, and damages), one 
purchasing manager raised his hand and said, "Heck, I haven't 
used a contract since 1989." The remaining thirty-nine 
managers confirmed this statement. Adapting quickly, the 
author soon realized that basic contract law is basically 
irrelevant. If this were a scholarly piece, the premise would be 
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Although I agreed completely with this latter suggestion, I had to 
point out that empirical research suggested that there was often not a 
written contract in the lIT contract situation.2o "Whose problem is it 
if there is no written contract?,,2! 
[Long silence and then a shrug.] 
phrased as follows: Courts (and laws) have failed to 
comprehend the problems contracting parties face, ergo parties 
have resorted to developing relationships with each other in 
lieu of reliance on the law. 
Marianne M. Jennings, The True Meaning ofReLationaL Contracts: We Don't 
Care About the MaiLbox RuLe, Mirror images, or Consideration Anymore--Are 
We Safe?, 73 DENV. U.L. REv. 3, 3 (1995). 
19 However, his contention that parties, at least in Germany, always deal with 
this issue is consistent with Marburg University Professor Schanze's argument 
contention that [trms would opt for "thick contracts" when choosing to 
outsource key production inputs; Erich Schanze, Beyond Contract and 
Corporation: The Law and Economics ofSymbiotic Arrangements, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: METHODOLOGY AND ApPLICATION 113 (Thomas Ruis & Ruth 
Neilsen, eds., 1998). 
20 See note 18 supra. See, e.g., Crawford Packaging Inc. v. W.E.T. Automotive 
Systems Ltd., 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 75, ~ 61 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 2006) ("The precise 
contours of the agreement can only be pieced together from the discussions had 
between Messrs. Crowe and Schieck on the part of Crawford and such W.E.T. 
staff as Roger Hudson, the then purchasing manager and his assistants, Diane 
Kerr and Lou-Anne Chadwick. In other words, no single piece of paper -- or 
contract document -- reflects the agreement that was put together."); Geneva 
Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc. 201, 281-82 (S.D.N.V. 2002), afJ'd in part 
and rev 'd in part, 386 F.3d 485 (2004) ("Invamed claims that a well-established 
custom in the industry was to rely on implied, unwritten supply commitments. 
Defendant Sherman affirmed under oath that 'the predominant practice is for 
these commitments not to be embodied in formal legal documents. '" Citations 
omitted.). 
21 Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Trade Usage and ConsequentiaL Damages: the 
implications for Just-in-Time Purchasing, 46 AM. Bus. L. J. 179 (2009). 
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THE MORALS: IMPLICATrONS FOR BUSINESS 
One moral for legal scholars is that by listening to business 
professionals and asking questions until a blank horrified stare is the 
result, a scholar can develop a research agenda22-and probably 
become a pariah at any social function. 
A common thread of the stories is that legal practitioners must think 
comprehensively about the legal and business effects of business 
practices or policies,23 because often the business practitioners may 
22 In addition to the current article, see Bennett, supra note 10 and Bennett,
 
supra note 21.
 
23 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Rosen, 2007 Survey ofBooks Related to the Law:
 
Corporate Law: Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime? Disneywar, Executive
 
Compensation, Corporate Governance and Business Law Pedagogy, 105 MICH.
 
L. REv. 115 I, 1154 (2007) ("Moreover, [law] students sometimes fail to realize 
that good business lawyering involves the provision of the type of counsel that 
can only be achieved through a deep understanding of clients' business model." 
Citations omitted); Harold A. Segall, An Executive's Lesson in the Law from a 
Typical Business Encounter, 23 FORDHAM URB. L. 1. 257,257-58 (J 996) ("A 
good commercial lawyer focuses not on a legal problem per se, but on the legal 
aspects ofa business problem"). See also, Sandra M. Huszagh & Fredrick W. 
Huszagh, Symposium: Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients: 
Lawyers as Exchange Engineers in Commerce: An Empirical Overview, 74 OR. 
L. REv. 147,147 (1995) (arguing that increased lawyer involvement in the 
commercial context is inevitable); John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Continuous 
Quality Improvement, Law, and Legal Education, 43 EMORY L. J. 393 (1994) 
(describing key characteristics of continuous quality improvement as 
propounded by W. Edwards Deming and their implications for law and legal 
education); Theresa M. Neff, Note: What Successful Companies Know that Law 
Firms Need to Know: The Importance ofEmployee Motivation and Job 
Satisfaction to Increased Productivity and Stronger Client Relationships, 17 1. 
L. & HEALTH 385 (2002/03) (pointing out that lawyers often do not concern 
themselves enough with the business aspects of their practices): Alina Dizik, 
Law Firms Embrace Business SchoollOf: As Recession Bites, More Attorneys 
Attend Management Training and Take Mini-M.B.A. Courses, WALL ST. 1., May 
20,2009, at B5 (noting the need for lawyers to better understand their clients' 
businesses). 
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not. In fact, it is not uncommon for business practitioners to 
completely ignore legal issues inherent in their business practices or 
policies until it is too late.24 Business faculty are often not much 
better. When I first began research exploring the legal issues of lIT, I 
found literally hundreds of books, articles and case studies on lIT.25 
24 For a fascinating discussion of this phenomenon, among others, and the 
implications for teaching contract law in law schools, see Robert M. Lloyd, 
Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons/or the First-Year Contracts 
Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 257, 262 (2004): 
One of the shortcomings of most contracts case books is that 
too many of the cases involve contracts in which the principals 
should have involved lawyers in the deal, but didn't. When 
you teach these cases, you can ask why the parties didn't get 
their lawyers involved until too late. In most of the cases, we 
can't identify the precise reason that these particular parties 
chose not to involve their lawyers, but we can talk about some 
of the common reasons business people want to keep lawyers 
out of their deals. Lawyers cost money. They slow down the 
deal, not only by insisting on dealing with contingencies the 
parties would rather ignore, but also by not always dropping 
whatever else they are doing in order to give this deal their 
undivided attention. Involving lawyers spoils the interpersonal 
chemistry between the parties, and, worst of all, lawyers kill 
deals by their over-meticulous concern with "legalistic" 
niceties. 
25 See, e.g., sources cited in note 13 supra; JOHN E. SCHORR, PURCHASING IN 
THE 21 ST CENTUR Y(1992); Yohannan Abraham et aI., Just-in-time: Supplier­
side Strategic Implications, INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYs., May-June 1990, at 12; 
Phillip W. Balsmeier, Just-in-Time: Implications and Applications/or 
Purchasing, 21 ARK. Bus. & ECON. REV. 28 (1988); Paul A. Dion et aI., Buyer 
Experiences with JIT: Some New Roles for Buyers, 28 MID-ATLANTIC 1. Bus. 
113 (1992); Cornelia Droege & Richard Germain, The Just-in-Time InventofY 
Effect: Does it Hold Under Different Contextual, Environmental, and 
Organizational Conditions?, 191. Bus. LOGISTICS 53 (1998); Jeffrey H. Dyer et 
aI., Strategic Supplier Segmentation: The Next "Best Practice" in Supply Chain 
Management, 40 CAL. MGMT. REv. 57 (1998); Marshall L. Fisher et aI., Making 
Supply Meet Demand in an Uncertain World, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 
1994, at 83; Paula 1. Haynes & Marilyn M. Helms, An Ethical Framework/or 
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None of them addressed any of the potential legal issues. Obviously 
one explanation for the lack of sensitivity to legal issues is the 
insufficiency of legal education in schools of business. 26 
Purchasing Decisions, 29/1 MGMT. DECISION 35 (1991); Robert H. Hayes & 
Gary P. Pisano, Beyond World-Class, The New Manufacturing Strategy, HARV. 
BUs. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 77; Cynthia Karen Swank, The Lean Service 
Machine, HARV. Bus. REV., Oct. 2003, at 123; Marvin W. Tucker & David A. 
Davis, Key Ingredients for Successful Implementation ofJust-in- Time: A System 
for All Business Sizes, BUS. HORIZONS, May-June, 1993, at 59; Peter Turnbull et 
aL, Buyer-Seller Relations in the UK Automotive Industry: Strategic 
Implications ofthe Japanese Manufacturing Model, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT 1. 159 
(1992); James P. Womack & Daniel T. Jones, From Lean Production to the 
Lean Enterprise, HARv. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 93; Paul H. Zipkin, Does 
Manufacturing Need a JIT Revolution?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 40. 
Numerous case studies of specific companies have appeared; see, e. g., 
Bill Costantino, Cedar Works: Making the Transition to Lean, in BECOMING 
LEAN: INSIDE STORIES OF U.S. MANUFACTURERS 303 (Jeffrey K. Liker, ed., 
I998)[hereinafter BECOMING LEAN] (Cedar Works); Michael R. Grant, EOQ 
and Price Break Analysis in a JIT Environment, 34/3 PRODUCTION & 
INVENTORY MGMT. 1. 64 (Summer, 1993) (Arizona Instrument); Vinod Kapoor, 
Becoming a Just-in-Time Vendor, 21 QUALITY PROGRESS 56 (1988) 
(Westinghouse); Vinod Kapoor, Converting to JIT: One Plant's Experience, 34 
PRODUCTION ENGINEERING 42 (1987) (Westinghouse); Jeffrey K. Liker & Keith 
Allman, The Donnelly Production System: Lean at Grand Haven, in BECOMING 
LEAN, supra, at 20 I (Donnelly); Gren Manuel, Tightening the Supply Chain, 
267 ENGINEER 64 (1988) (Hewlett-Packard); Lee H. North, Beyondjust-in-time: 
The UCLA Medical Center Experience, 15/3 HOSPITAL MATERJAL MGMT Q. 36 
(1994); and Matthew J. Zayko et aI., Implementing Lean Manufacturing at 
Gelman Sciences, Inc., in BECOMING LEAN, supra, at 247 (Gelman Sceinces, 
Inc.); Susan Zimmerman, How JIT buying works when you're the supplier, 
PURCHASING, Feb. 7, 1991, at 42 (Industrial Powder Coatings). 
See Supply Chain Challenges: Building Relationships, HARV. BuS. 
REV., July 2003, at 65, for a discussion of current issues in supply chain 
management. 
26 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating Legally-Aware 
Accountants, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 597 (2001); George 1. Siedel, Commentary: Six 
Forces and the Legal Environment ofBusiness: The Relative Value ofBusiness 
Law Among Business School Courses, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 717 (2000). 
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lIT is a complex business tool that brings undeniable benefits with it. 
The storage, handling and finance costs associated with inventory can 
be considerable. Moreover, inventory becomes a "sunk cost" which 
reduces the flexibility of the manufacturer to make changes in output 
to meet alteration in demand. 
Like many business tools, it brings some risks and costs as well. 
Arguably those risks, including the legal risks, have been 
underappreciated as lIT became a fad which companies rushed to 
adopt--{)r were forced to adopt. The risk of legal liability has been 
almost completely ignored. To fully maximize the benefits of lIT, 
companies must completely eliminate inventory from the industrial 
process, including work-in-process inventory and inventory which is 
held by suppliers. However, inventory serves a buffer function, 
preventing the shutdown of the production line if a problem occurs. 
Reducing or eliminating inventory increases the risk ofa production 
shutdown.27 Obviously, this risk increases if suppliers are at distant 
locations, in times of labor unrest, or if there are long lead times for 
production of components or intervening practical or legal 
impediments, like national borders with customs inspections. Hence, 
entering into a lIT arrangement should involve a careful balancing of 
inventory minimization and risk. When dealing with third party 
suppliers, it also involves allocating the rewards and the risk of 
27 In Ohno's analysis, the possibility of production stoppages was anticipated­
even embraced. He argued that a shut-down merely revealed the problems 
which could then be resolved. OHNO, supra note 13, at 7 ("Stopping the 
machine when there is trouble forces awareness on everyone. When the 
problem is clearly understood, improvement is possible."). See, also, Phred 
Dvorak, Ups and Downs Whipsaw Supply Chains, WALL ST. J., May] 8,2009, 
at A1 (noting that different supplier lead times for production of component 
parts may lead to shortages in the supply chain if suppliers do not accurately 
forecast demand). 
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stoppages between the parties. Such allocations of risks are generally 
enforceable. 28 
The allocation of the benefits and risks should be the product of 
detailed discussion between the parties29 which should lead to a 
written contract. 30 However, if lIT is viewed through the prism of 
traditional contract analysis, the result is likely to be disappointment 
for both parties. The metaphor of the so-called "prisoner's dilemma" 
is instructive. The prisoner's dilemma is an abstraction of the 
situation where two parties each have the option to cooperate with 
each other or pursue their respective individual interests (i.e., defect) 
where the rewards for cooperating are modest and the rewards for 
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-303 (2009). 
29 See Lloyd, supra note 24, at 270-71 : 
It's not really an oversimplification to say that the lawyer's job 
is to identifY the risks in the deal and attempt to shift them to 
someone else. I say "attempt" because that someone else we're 
trying to stick with the risks has a lawyer who is trying to do 
exactly the same thing to us. A simple economic model of the 
transaction is this: The parties tentatively agree on the price 
and then the price is adjusted up or down as the parties 
identi fY and allocate risks. If the buyer assumes a particu lar 
risk, the price is adjusted upwards. If the seller assumes one, it 
is adjusted downwards. 
Lloyd argues that in real life, price adjustments rarely occur as a result of risk­
shifting, but are more the product of trading of "markers" between the lawyers, 
or uneven risk allocation reflects uneven negotiating ability. For a discussion of 
this kind of economic analysis in the context of JIT, see Bennett, supra note 21, 
at 193-97.
 
30 See, generally, Scott 1. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 AR[Z. L. REv.
 
133 (2003) (though concerned with contract reading, Professor Burnham
 
provides a number of issues to think about when drafting contracts); Christina L.
 
Kunz, Teaching First-Year Students How to Read and Edit Contract Clauses, 34
 
U. TaL. L. REv. 705,712-13 (2003); James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in the 
Client's Interest, 51 S.c. L REv. 153 (1999); Harold A. Segall, Drafting: An 
Essential Skill, 30 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 751 (2003). 
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defecting are great, but only at the expense of the other party. It 
draws its name from the dilemma faced by two prisoners who are 
arrested for committing a crime. If both cooperate in their 
declarations of innocence, they both have a small chance to go free; if 
one agrees to testify against the other, the defector receives beneficial 
treatment compared to the other prisoner; but ifboth agree to confess, 
the benefits of implicating the other are IOSt. 31 Applied to business or 
contracts, the prisoner's dilemma is a reflection of reality. Often 
opportunistic behavior of one party can be richly rewarded in 
business-at least in the short run. Ofcourse, opportunistic behavior 
frequently results in loss of trust or in retaliation by the aggrieved 
party.32 Note that this is inconsistent with the theoretical notion 
encountered in contract remedies that a contract breach is a morally 
neutral event. 33 The parties are not likely to view this as a morally 
31 For a discussion of the prisoner's dilemma and its application to business, 
see, MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 38-41 
(6 th Ed. 2006). See also, RiCHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 202-233 (Rev. 
ed. 1989), (describing in detail the prisoner's dilemma and related research and 
arguing that life often presents prisoner's dilemma the survival of species may 
be dependent upon cooperation, which may seem to run counter to immediate 
self-interest). 
32 This tendency is noted in VELASQUEZ, supra note 31, at 41 ; Robert E. Scott, 
The Death ofContract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L. J. 369, 382-84 (2004). There is 
some indication in the literature that parties wiJJ punish defectors, even if there 
is no benefit to them, a phenomenon which Professor Ernst Fehr calls "altruistic 
punishment." See Sharon Begley, Science Journal: Vengeance Is Mine, Sayeth 
the Lord --But Scientists Differ, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 15,2004, at B I. 
33 Professor CampbeJJ makes the point that breach should not be viewed as a 
"amoral or immoral failure by the breaching party" strongly and cogently, but I 
argue with a marked disregard of the real ity of human interactions; David 
Campbell, Symposium: The Common Lrnv ofContracts as a World Force in 
Two Ages ofRevolution: A Conference Celebrating the J50'" Anniversary of 
Hadley v, Baxendale: Foreseeability and Damages: The Relational 
Constitution ofRemedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second Principle of 
Remedies for Breach ofContract, II TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 455,455-57 
(2005). Professor Macaulay gently takes him to task for this and other 
departures from the real world of business in Stewart Macaulay, Renegotiations 
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neutral event and will retaliate. The retaliation may take the form of 
litigation or refusal to deal in the future. The threat of retaliation 
means that opportunistic behavior is ill-advised when the parties 
expect to have repeated dealings. 34 When the parties expect repeated 
dealings, cooperation is the best business strategy. Arguably, 
cooperation in this context means an express sharing of the risks of 
the elimination of the buffer inventory. 
In JIT arrangements, there are situations where either party might 
reap supernormal rewards through opportunistic behavior. 35 For 
and Selliements Dr. Pangloss 's Notes on the Margins ofDavid Cambell's
 
Papers, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 261 (2007).
 
34 See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of
 
Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1077, 1080 (2005):
 
I do not intend to demonstrate, for example, that there 
are no insights from economic analysis of law in the world of 
complex deals. Indeed, I bel ieve it is a fundamental truth that 
people act in their own interest, and that as to aspects of the 
deal process, they are primarily rational actors. But I also 
believe it is a fundamental truth that something compels us to 
regard others with a sense of honor, obligation, and 
responsibility. What I will argue is that both truths are 
apparent on a regular basis, regardless of the governing law or 
rational actor economics in complex commercial 
arrangements. Human beings do not check at the office door 
their impulse to find ways to make sense of why things go 
wrong in the world and to impose order on the chaos - whether 
through contract, personal relationships, self-deception, 
economic analysis, or moral philosophy. Contracts are one 
way to deal with contingency. Submitting disputes to ajudge 
when we disagree is another. Neither is exclusive. 
35 Uri Benoliel notes the same issues in the manufacturer/distributor relationship 
including the opportunity for opportunistic behavior and argues that the 
relationship should be viewed as a reciprocal fiduciary relationship. Uri 
Benoliel, Rethinking the Distributor-Manufacturer Relationship: A Marketing 
Channels Perspective, 45 AM. Bus. L. J. 187 (2008). 
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example, proponents of lIT advise a manufacturer to rely on one 
supplier as a sole source for parts,36 in contrast to earlier thinking 
which advised multiple sourcing, to protect manufacturers from 
unreliable suppliers and to allow the manufacturer to "play suppliers 
off against each other" to receive preferential pricing. The idea 
behind single sourcing is to give the parties the incentive to improve 
and integrate their processes in order to make the overall 
manufacturing process leaner and more efficient. By moving to sole 
sourcing, particularly if the component is a specially manufactured 
good, the manufacturer becomes more vulnerable to problems 
affecting the supplier37 or to opportunistic behavior of the supplier.38 
36 See, e.g., Mixon & Otto, supra note 23, at 398.
 
37 In RI71 Enterprises Ltd. v. Sunrise Construction Ltd., 45 S.C.L.R. (4 th ) 125,
 
45 C.L.R. (3d) 68,141 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1072, ~~ 79-123 (S.c. S.c. 2005), the
 
Court had to apportion the losses resulting from a fire which destroyed the
 
factory of a sole source JIT supplier. The manufacturer only had two days'
 
supply of the component on hand and the supplier had an additional two days'
 
supply. Following the fire, it took the supplier 12 weeks to become operational
 
again. The Court noted:
 
79 The fire that engul fed the plant and offices of Crown 
West Steel was a disaster with far-reaching consequences. Not 
only was the business and undertaking of Crown West Steel 
brought to an abrupt halt, but prospectively so to was the truck 
manufacturing business of Westem Star. Crown West Steel 
was the main supplier of frame rails to Western Star, and 
Westem Star kept no significant inventory of frame rails on 
hand, applying the "just in time" inventory method, which 
finely dovetailed the productive capacity of Crown West Steel 
to the supply need of Western Star. Thus, two businesses were 
very much at risk, as well as were their employees and the 
families of their employees. 
38 See, e.g., recent Canadian cases involving this situation, Windsor Mold Inc. 
v. Express Molding International Inc., 130 A.C.W.S. (3d) 86 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 
2004), afJ'd, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 285 (2005) (involving a sole supplier who 
refused to make JIT deliveries unless disputed invoices were paid by the 
manufacturer); Faurecia Automotive Seating Canada Inc. v. YSA, LLC, 140 
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The manufacturer may be unable to quickly cover if the supplier does 
not deliver, delivers nonconforming goods, or becomes insolvent. 
Conversely, sole sourcing raises the business stakes for the supplier. 
To the extent a single manufacturer becomes a greater part of the 
supplier's business, the supplier becomes vulnerable to opportunistic 
behavior by the manufacturer. 39 One example is when Jose Ignalio 
Lopez de Arriortua, the head of purchasing for General Motors, 
demanded that all of its suppliers reduce their prices by as much as 
twenty percent or more if they wanted to retain GM's business.4o A 
more contemporary example is Wal-mart, though not a manufacturer, 
which allegedly uses its market dominance to extract price and other 
contract concessions from its suppliers.41 To be successful in a long 
A.C.W.S.(3d) 469 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 2005) (involving a sole supplier under a JIT
 
contract who refused to make further shipments unless the manufacturer agreed
 
to make five changes to the contract).
 
39 See. e.g., a recent Canadian case, L & L Tool Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
 
132 A.C. W.S. (3d) 9 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 2004) (involving a claim by a supplier
 
under a JIT contract that GM caused its bankruptcy by providing noncomplying
 
raw materials, by demanding unnecessary express shipping expense, and by
 
delaying payments).
 
40 Alan L. Adler, GM's Lopez uses tough medicine to restore ailing
 
automaker's health, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 4, 1992, at B1; ErJe Norton,
 
Balking Us. Automotive Suppliers Talk OfGiving Up Business With Car
 
Maker, WALL ST. J. , Nov. 2, 1992, at A8; Joseph B. White & Neal Templin,
 
Harsh Regimen, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1992, at A1 ("For months GM has been
 
shredding supplier contracts and demanding price cuts of20% or more.");
 
Joseph B. White, GM's Lopez Says He Will Accelerate, Expand Cost-Cutting
 
Despite Criticism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1992, at AS. This opportunistic
 
behavior had short term rewards-at least for Lopez. He was hired away to
 
perform similar magic for Volkswagen. General Motors sued Lopez and
 
Volkswagen for theft of trade secrets. A cynic might wonder what is so secret
 
about dominating and abusing suppliers, particularly when played out on the
 
front pages of newspapers. The parties ultimately agreed to settle the civil suit.
 
Robin Meredith, VW Agrees to Pay G. M $100 Million in Espionage Suit, N.Y.
 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, available at NYTimes.com.
 
4\ See, e.g., Anthony Bianco et aI., Is Wal-mart Too Powerful?, Bus. WK., Oct.
 
6, 2003, available at
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term relationship,42 the parties in a JIT contract are going to have to 
forego opportunities for opportunistic behavior. 43 
Although the parties to a JIT contract do not plan to ever rely on a 
written contract,44 they should explicitly agree on expectations and 
allocation of risk in a lIT arrangement, even if there may be no 
enforceability problems with an oral agreement under the applicable 
statute of frauds. 45 The business relationship envisioned by a lIT 
supply contract is complicated enough,46 but when the legal risks are 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_40/b3852001_mzOOl.htm; 
Charles Fishman, The Wal-mart You Don 'f Know, FAST COMPANY, Dec. 2003, 
available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/77/walmart.htm t. 
42 1 use the word "relationship" consciously, intending to invoke the rich, 
developing literature on relational contracting. For a general overview, see 
Richard E. Speidel, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions: A 
Symposium in Honor of fan R. Macneil: The Characteristics and Challenges of 
Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823 (2000). For a more jaundiced and 
humorous view of relational contracting, see Jennings, supra note 18. 
43 See, e.g., Huszagh & Huszagh, supra note 23, at 155 (emphasizing the 
importance of trust, equity, responsibility and commitment in relational 
exchanges). 
44 See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 24, at 263 ("When the neophyte lawyer 
negotiates and drafts her first contract, she usually expects that the client and its 
business partner will use the contract to guide their business relationship. The 
experienced business lawyer knows better. The more likely scenario is that the 
contract will be stuffed in a file drawer and pulled out only when there is a 
dispute. Even then, the parties are likely to consult the contract only when 
they've tried to resolve the dispute amicably and are threatening litigation."). 
45 Although most JIT contracts wou Id invo Ive contracts for the sale of goods in 
excess of$500 and would normally require a writing under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
25-2-20 I (I) (2009), disputes would often be subject to the exceptions for 
specially manufactured goods, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (3) (a) (2009), or 
with respect to goods which have been accepted or payment received, N.C. GEN. 
ST AT. § 25-2-20 I (3) (c) (2009), or where a confirmatory memorandum has been 
sent-possibly creating a "battle of the forms" problem, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25­
2-20 I (2) (2009). 
46 They are complicated enough that it will be difficult to comprehensively set 
forth the rights and obligations of the parties, and the written contract will 
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considered, the parties do not want to leave the potential problems for 
retroactive allocation by the COurtS. 47 As my McFirm business 
consultant opined, the parties would have to be crazy to proceed 
without a written contract.48 Moreover, this is a particularly poor type 
always be supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing and trade 
usage. See Bennett, supra note 21. The literature on relational contracting is 
pertinent. Professors Bird and Charters succinctly summarize relational contract 
theory as follows: 
A well-established body of literature, called relational 
contracting, holds that any agreement is governed in part by 
numerous external relationships and factors outside the four 
corners of the contract. Relational contract theory is supported 
by four fundamental principles. First, most transactions are 
surrounded by complex relationships between the parties. 
Second, these relationships are necessary to fully understand 
such transactions. Third, essential relational elements exist 
between parties that can significantly affect the nature of an 
agreement. Fourth, a contextual examination of these 
relational elements produces a more complete understanding 
of the relevant agreement. 
Robert C. Bird & Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in 
Canada and the United States: A Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. 
Bus. L. 1. 205, 244 (2004). 
47 Note that Professor Scott makes a contra point summarizing empirical 
experimental results: 
In the absence of a legally enforceable obligation, reciprocal 
fairness-Qperating alone-generates high levels of 
cooperative behavior. But once the exchange is subject to a 
legally enforceable claim, the evidence shows that voluntary 
reciprocity declines and the overall level of cooperation 
declines as well. These experimental results suggest that 
explicit legal incentives and self-enforcing reciprocity may 
well be in conflict with one another. In short, legal 
enforcement may 'crowd out' behavior based on reciprocal 
fairness. 
Scott, supra note 32, at 388.
 
48 See also, Scott, J. Burnham, Contractual Relations in Small Business: Do
 
the Benefits ofa Custom-Made Contract Outweigh the Costs, 7 1. SMALL &
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of business arrangement to leave to a "battle of the forms" between 
contradictory order forms and bills of lading or invoices.49 Note that 
most of the default terms under the Uniform Commercial Code can 
be varied by agreement of the parties. 50 
EMERGING Bus. L. 425 (2003) (arguing that generally the benefits of a custom­
made contract outweigh the potential costs, even for small businesses). 
49 The so-called "battle of the forms" problem normally occurs where the buyer 
uses an order form with one set of standard provisions on the back and the seller 
responds with an "acceptance" in the form of an acknowledgment of order or 
invoice with a separate set of standard provisions on the back. The legal results 
to a battle of the forms have been determined, quite unsatisfactorily, by N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-207 (2009). The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws has proposed an abandonment of the current formula in 
favor of one that will be no more helpful. See National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Amendments to Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, § 2-207, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bIJlarchives/uJc/ucc2/annuaI2002.htm. wh ich 
resolves the battle of the forms problem as ajump ball with the court as referee. 
As proposed Official Comment 3 notes: 
3. By inviting a court to determine whether a party "agrees" to 
the other party's terms, the text recognizes the enormous 
variety of circumstances that may be presented under this 
section, and the section gives the court greater discretion to 
include or exclude certain terms than original Section 2-207 
did. In many cases, perfOlmance alone should not be construed 
to be agreement to the terms in another's record by one that 
has sent or will send its own record with additional or different 
terms. Thus a party that sends a record (however labeled or 
characterized, including an offer, counteroffer, acceptance, 
acknowledgment, purchase order, confirmation or invoice) 
with additional or different terms should not be regarded as 
having agreed to any of the other party's additional or different 
terms by performance. In that case, the terms are determined 
under paragraph (a) (terms in both records) and paragraph (c) 
(supplied or incorporated by this Act). Concomitantly, 
performance after an original agreement between the parties 
(orally, electronically or otherwise) should not nomlally be 
construed to be agreement to terms in the other's record unless 
that record is part of the original agreement. 
50 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-302 (a) (2009). 
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A recent Canadian case, Crawford Packaging Inc. v. WE. T. 
Automotive Systems Ltd., is illustrative. 51 A long term, lIT supply 
contract fell apart and the court was left trying to sort out the 
resulting dispute between the parties by piecing together 
documents---or parts thereof, course of dealing, course of 
performance, and conflicting testimony of the parties. The defendant 
sought to argue that all order forms contained a reference to terms 
and conditions on the back which should determine its contractual 
obligation. However, the purchasing manager admitted that the 
orders went out by fax, perhaps without the standard terms and 
conditions. 52 In its finding of facts, the Court noted: 
It is a curious feature of this case that neither side was 
able to produce a complete original or even a true 
copy ofany of the purchase orders which were issued. 
The plaintiffs witnesses denied that Crawford ever 
received a copy of the purchase orders with a reverse 
side of any kind and said they were unaware of the 
terms and conditions. Mr. Tong insisted that W.E.T. 
would send out complete copies to the supplier but 
conceded his company could not produce any original 
purchase order or duplicate. 53 
Though the defendant tendered what it said were the standard terms 
and conditions, the Court noted skeptically: 
First Ex. 5 contains eight pages of single-spaced print 
and includes 25 separate paragraphs. While the 
51 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 75, ~ 61 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 2006).
 
52 Id. at ~ 37.
 
53 ld. at ~ 69.
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purchase documents in the record do say that they are 
"[s]ubject to the terms and conditions specified on the 
reverse side" (emphasis added.), I find it impossible to 
believe that the eight page document (Ex. 5) could 
have been squeezed onto the reverse side ofany of the 
purchase documents. In short, I am not satisfied that 
Ex. 5 and its terms was ever communicated to the 
plaintiff and, additionally, I am not satisfied that the 
defendant ever relied on it in its dealings with the 
plaintiff. 54 
It is clear that these standard terms and conditions were not designed 
to provide for the special problems associated with a lIT supply 
arrangement and it is also unlikely that they would agree in total with 
the forms or understanding of the supplier. 55 
Among the critical contract terms that the parties should explicitly 
agree on is what events or conditions will constitute an event of 
default under the contract and the remedies upon default. The most 
common problems which would concern manufacturers would be a 
late delivery or the delivery ofnonconforming goods. Either problem 
could have the result of stoppage of production of the manufacturer 
and consequential damages if the manufacturer exhausts its buffer 
inventory. Obviously, the seller would not want to assume liability 
for consequential damages in any case, but particularly if the source 
of the problem is out of the control of the seller. Hence, the seller 
will want to include a "force majeure clause." A force majeure clause 
typically excuses a party from liability for events or conditions 
outside of its control, excluding delayed performance resulting from 
54 !d. at ~ 85. 
55 Id. at ~ 86-87. 
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events such as wars, riots, natural disasters, strikes, problems with 
infrastructure or common carriers, or government restrictions. 56 The 
exact parameters of the excusing conditions are often heavily 
negotiated and may be a good litmus test for the cooperative risk­
sharing inclinations of the parties. Likewise, it will be particularly 
important for the seller to limit remedies and particularly to disclaim 
liability for consequential damages. 57 Disclaimers of liability for 
56 Thomas Lundmark cites what he says is a typical force majeure clause: 
14.11 FORCE MAJEURE. Neither party shall lose any rights 
hereunder or be liable to the other party for damages or losses 
(except for payment obligations) on account of failure of 
performance by the defaulting party if the failure is occasioned 
by war, strike, fire, Act of God, earthquake, flood, lockout, 
embargo, governmental acts or orders or restrictions, failure of 
suppliers, or any other reason where failure to perform is 
beyond the reasonable control and not caused by the 
negligence, intentional conduct or misconduct of the 
nonperforming party has exerted all reasonable efforts to 
avoid or remedy such force majeure; provided, however, that 
in no event shall a party be required to settle any Jabor dispute 
or disturbance. 
Thomas Lundmark, Verbose Contracts, 49 AM. J. COMPo L. 121, 127-28 (2001)
 
(citations omitted).
 
57 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-719 (2009) provides:
 
Contractual modification or limitation of remedy 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of 
this section and of the preceding section [G.S. 25-2-718] on 
liquidation and limitation of damages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or 
in substitution for those provided in this article and may limit 
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this article, 
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of 
nonconforming goods or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional un less the 
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is 
the sole remedy. 
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consequential damages are likely to be enforceable, where, as in the 
case of lIT contracts, the parties are merchants and, hence, of more 
equal bargaining power. 58 Because of the time constraints of 
operating in a lIT environment, the selling supplier may have no 
practical ability to cure if it delivers nonconfonning goods. This 
would be especially problematic in a case like MM, Inc. 's discussed 
above where there is a long lead time required in order to fabricate 
replacement goods. 
If the buying manufacturer concedes on issues related to force 
majeure and consequential damages, it risks being put in an untenable 
position if the supplier does not deliver confonning goods in a timely 
manner and it has to shut down its production line, even ifarguably it 
is not the seller's fault, as it was not MM, Inc. 's fault above, but the 
fault of its supplier-which would be the subject of disclaimer in 
many force majeure clauses. 
Likewise, in the event of default, the parties should give some 
consideration to the remedies available to the parties. The parties 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy 
to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided 
in this chapter. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless 
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of 
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation 
of damages where the loss is commercial is not. 
58 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-719 (3) (2009). See Lloyd, supra note 24, at 267-70 
("Students are amazed when I tell them that it is virtually unheard of for a 
sophisticated party, or even a party only moderately sophisticated, to prevail on 
an unconscionability argument." Id. at 267.) 
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should explicitly consider nonjudicial resolution ofdisputes-which 
would be consistent with the relational nature of the contract. 59 
Another legal alternative is for the parties to agree upon a liquidated 
damages formula that would be due upon a late or defective 
delivery.6o As long as the liquidated damage formula does not 
penalize the supplier and represents a reasonable expectation of the 
damages that the manufacturer would suffer, it is likely to be 
enforceable.6! To the extent that the liquidated damage formula 
includes a consequential damages component, it would be 
transferring considerable risk to the supplier. 62 
59 See also, Huszagh & Huszagh, supra note 23, at 155-57 (noting that the 
lawyer has a role to play in creating, maintaining and terminating exchange 
relationships). See also, Mixon & Otto, supra note 23, at 417-20 (arguing that 
American law is moving in a Deming oriented direction by encouraging and 
facilitating alternative dispute resolution and by "softening" the competitive 
model of contact law with the "doctrines of good faith, mitigation of damages, 
unconscionability, and relational contract law through which courts resolve 
contract disputes in a reasonable, sometimes paternalistic way."). 
60 Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the 
Law a/Contract, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 114-21 (1989) (Epstein is sharply 
critical of traditional consequential damages analysis and concludes: "The 
plaintiff whose level of recovery is fixed in advance has a powerful incentive to 
mitigate his loss. "). 
61 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-718 (I) (2009) ("Damages for breach by either party 
may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in 
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties 
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining 
an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is 
void as a penalty. "). But, see Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory 0/Efficient Penalty: 
Eliminating the Law a/Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BuS. L.J. 633 (2001) 
(taking a close look at the law of liquidated damages and arguing that liquidated 
damage provisions ought to be enforceable without this special scrutiny if they 
were part of the basis of the bargain). 
62 In one case, the court noted as an aside that the contractual liability to the 
supplier under ajust in time supply contract for General Motors for downtime 
on the manufacturer's assembly line "ran as high as $25,000 per minute of 
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A more reasonable contractual alternative might be to effectuate the 
business expectations of my McFilm consultant and to provide that if 
the supplier is late for a certain period, or a certain number of times 
within a given time frame, the manufacturer has the option to 
terminate the supply contract. A provision of this sort would give the 
supplier considerable incentive to perform in a timely malU1er but 
would not saddle it with all of the risks of the elimination of buffer 
inventory. Such a provision would also benefit the manufacturer by 
removing any ambiguity regarding what breaches would constitute a 
material breach under the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions 
with respect to installment contracts. 63 
downtime." NLRB v. Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468,1472 (6th Cir. 1993) (note
 
omitted).
 
63 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-601; 25-2-612 (2009). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-612
 
provides:
 
(I) An "installment contract" is one which requires or 
authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be 
separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause 
"each delivery is a separate contract" or its equivalent. 
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is 
nonconfonning if the nonconformity substantially impairs the 
value of that installment and cannot be cured or if the 
nonconformity is a defect in the required documents; but if the 
nonconfonnity does not fall within subsection (3) and the 
seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must 
accept that installment. 
(3) Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one 
or more installments substantially impairs the value of the 
whole contract there is a breach of the whole. But the 
aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a 
nonconfonning installment without seasonably notifying of 
cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past 
installments or demands perfonnance as to future install ments. 
Hence, without an agreement of the parties in advance, the courts would have to 
resolve whether a breach substantially impaired the value of the whole contract. 
The traditional explanation of the departure from the "perfect tender" rule in § 
2-60 I is that this provision represents the Code's attempt to preserve contractual 
relationships. 
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The parties may want to agree upon a variety of business techniques 
to reduce potential problems with the JIT arrangement. For example, 
the manufacturer may want the supplier to locate his facility near its 
plant to avoid delays resulting from transportation related problems. 
Alternatively, the supplier could warehouse a small buffer inventory 
ofparts near the manufacturer to allow it to quickly cure in the event 
of a late or nonconforming delivery. Of course, either of these 
alternatives raise the commitment costs of the supplier and make the 
supplier more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior of the 
manufacturer. 64 
From a business perspective, the manufacturer will want to carefully 
evaluate the risk of sole-sourcing, particularly if the goods are 
specially manufactured to the manufacturer's specification. Sole 
sourcing of specially manufacturer goods would drastically limit a 
manufacturer's ability to cover in the event ofdefective performance 
by the supplier. For example, in the auto industry, there would be 
much less risk in sole sourcing a generic product, like tires, than there 
would be in sole sourcing an engine part which was designed for a 
particular car. 
64 See, e.g., Crawford Packaging Inc. v. W.E.T. Automotive Systems Ltd., 145 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 75, ~ 61 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 2006), where the supplier agreed to 
warehouse a three month supply of inventory and to deliver it to the 
manufacturer on a daily basis. The manufacturer ultimately terminated the 
supply contract without notice, leaving the supplier with $50,000 of inventory, 
leading to the lawsuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, the life of the law is 
experience,65 i.e., stories. It is my hope that the stories presented and 
analyzed in this article emphasize the importance of lawyers 
developing a better understanding of business problems and of 
business practitioners developing a better understanding of law, and 
the use of contracts as a means of allocating risk. Both groups may 
not recognize the risk of consequential damages as a "bet the firm" 
risk for a supplier entering into a lIT supply arrangement. Hopefully 
these stories and their morals highlight these risks and the importance 
of cooperative behavior between manufacturers and their suppliers. 
65 Note 7 and accompanying text supra. 
